The Ukrainian Dilemma: Why defeat is inevitable at this rate

More than two years have passed since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. Economies have been wrecked, cities have been destroyed, and hundreds of thousands have been killed, yet neither side is seriously ready to negotiate. The incompatibility between Russian and Ukrainian goals will ensure that the war will continue until there is a victor. A thorough analysis of the trajectory of combat potential and sustainment can determine this eventual victor.

Wars can unfold in a plethora of distinct ways. When many think of war, they imagine the traditional picture of sweeping pincers and piercing strikes deep behind enemy lines. Consequently, many analysts succumb to the fallacy that victory is exclusively won through offensive action. The glaring limitation of this idea is that various parameters on the battlefield can eliminate any prospects of mobile warfare. This is undeniably the case in Ukraine, where drone reconnaissance, tough entrenchments, and heavy artillery have kept the frontline rigid. The only method of attaining victory in such conflicts is to grind down enemy forces through sustained attrition. This principle can be exemplified by the Western front of the First World War, where the greater resources of the Entente eventually forced the Germans into surrender. The German forces had inflicted higher losses on their adversaries, and the Entente had not yet pushed into German territory when the surrender came. However, the Germans could see the writing on the wall in the form of fresh reinforcements from America. In such a war, tactical genius gives way to fighting dominated by primitive frontal attacks. Casualties remain relatively even on both sides, leaving victory to the belligerent with more extensive resources.

Russia is decisively larger than Ukraine in population, equipment, and production capacity. Akin to the Entente in the First World War, the Russian advantage in size allows it to deplete Ukrainian resources at the cost of its own. This advantage becomes more pronounced when considering political systems. Putin's autocratic regime in Russia has a greater ability to maintain societal order and a continuous fighting force through centralized control. On the other hand, the Ukrainian democracy must rely on unwavering popular support, which can be challenging to preserve in prolonged wars of attrition.

However, many analysts would rightly point out that the ratio of casualties is heavily lopsided in Ukraine's favor. If extreme enough, this ratio could negate the Russian size advantage. United States Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, has claimed there have been at least 350,000 Russian casualties, while the Ministry of Defense of the United Kingdom has put this number at upwards of 450,000. As for Ukraine, the most recent US estimate placed Ukrainian casualties at around 190,000 as of August 2023. An extrapolation of this figure suggests that the total number of Ukrainian casualties has risen to 260,000. Even disregarding the incentive of these Western nations to skew the numbers in Ukrainian favor, this ratio of losses still favors Russia. The Ukrainian population is over 3.5 times smaller. For casualties to be equal relative to population, Russian losses would have to be above 900,000, or Ukrainian losses would have to be under 130,000.

The second critical factor for sustaining a nation's war-making capability is its equipment losses and capacity to replace them. Just under 17,000 Russian vehicles have been visually confirmed to have been destroyed. While this is a colossal number, production and refurbishment have been ramping up to meet the demand for replacements. Russia currently produces 4 million artillery shells annually, while the West only produces 3.5 million collectively. The combination of high military production capacity and deep stockpiles of Soviet equipment allow Russia to keep the war going for a long time. Comparatively, Ukraine has no military production outside of drones and relies exclusively on Western support. Visually confirmed Ukrainian equipment losses have risen to over 8,000 throughout the war. The current level of Western support would have to be ramped up for these losses to be replaced. Despite losing less than half the number of vehicles, Ukraine will run out first at this rate.

However, developing an accurate picture of losses and potential for regeneration is challenging when available information is fragmented and unreliable. Instead, one can gauge the current state of a conflict by analyzing the behavior of the belligerents. Consider that Russia has been on the offensive for nearly the entire duration of the war. In attritional warfare dominated by heavy entrenchments, offensive actions almost always result in higher losses. If the Russians did not have the resources to sustain the current war of attrition, they would be defensive, hoping to get more with less. Instead, the heavy Russian pressure and high intensity of attacks indicate their confidence, as they are willing to lose soldiers at an unfavorable rate to increase pressure. In the few moments when Ukraine built up enough forces to become offensive, the Russian military was more than willing to go on the defensive for better loss ratios.

The only way for Ukraine to evade defeat in the war of attrition is to break the stalemate and change the dynamic of the conflict. To penetrate the Russian lines, Ukrainian forces would need vast quantities of equipment and highly motivated soldiers. An attempt of this nature was already made in the spring and summer of 2023 and failed catastrophically. Twelve brigades with modern Western weaponry and training were repelled with significant losses. This offensive was conducted when military aid from the West was at its greatest and still failed. With support recently taking a big hit due to Republican obstructionism in the House of Representatives, the situation on the frontline was even worse. The blockage of aid lasted for months and drove Ukraine into a severe shortage of artillery shells and other vital weaponry. This allowed the Russians to win a series of victories, including the seizure of the key city of Avdiivka. More important than these minor territorial gains was the increased attritional damage on Ukrainian forces due to their lack of resources to endure combat.

Future levels of support for Ukraine among Western nations remain uncertain. Many populists have condemned the policy of sending weapons to Ukraine with the claim that it is unchecked and fiscally irresponsible. In the United States in particular, the public's outlook on aid began to sour as the war progressed. Multiple factors coalesced to produce this result, including distance from the war, little movement of the frontlines, and other major conflicts and news stories. Nations inevitably become fatigued of conflict after protracted periods of time with little immediate prospect of victory. While a large aid bill was recently passed and public support slightly rebounded, it would be unlikely for Ukraine to enjoy the same support as it did early on in the conflict. The election of former US president Donald Trump this November would exacerbate the dilemma. He favors a much more isolationist approach to Ukraine compared to the current political leadership in Washington.

If prior aid was not enough to break the deadlock, and aid generally decreases over time, Ukraine will never be able to escape the war of attrition. While Russia already prefers attritional combat, decreased supplies of Western weapons will make this style of warfare even more preferential. Whether it takes one year or ten, Ukraine lose unless dramatic escalations are made by the West.

An analysis of Russian and Eastern European history also gives insight into this prediction. The current conflict in Ukraine would not be the first time that Western perspectives have underestimated the Russian psyche and ability to fight. In 1812, Napoleon invaded Russia with the largest army ever assembled and seized Moscow. However, the French army entered the city only to see a burning husk. The Russians would rather destroy their most prized city than leave it to the French occupiers. Bitter attacks from the Russian cossacks and army, as well as a harsh winter, soon finished Napoleon's army. A parallel situation would unfold a century later. In 1941 Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in a withering attack that scattered and destroyed large parts of the Soviet Army. However, the Germans did not realize how bitterly the Russians would fight to repel their invasion and were driven back. Around 30 million Soviets lost their lives in the fighting on the Eastern Front, which has been established as the most brutal fighting in human history. These prior conflicts illustrate that Russian society has been prepared to achieve victory by any means possible.

Many might point to counterexamples like the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan to reconcile visions of a Ukrainian victory. The thought is that if they hold on for long enough, the Russians will be forced to withdraw just like the Soviets did from Afghanistan in 1989. However, this analysis ignores the primary reason the Russians fought with such determination in the other wars. The invasions of Napoleon and Hitler were battles for the motherland itself, whereas the war in Afghanistan was a faraway conflict with little to no effect on the Russian people. Whether it makes sense to Western observers or not, the Russian populace and leadership view Ukraine as an essential piece of their world. In their minds, a quiet Western invasion has pulled Ukraine away. Using the words of Belarusian dictator Aleksandr Lukashenko, they will fight as long as it takes to "bring Ukraine back into the fold."

In this conflict, sympathy must lie with the Ukrainian people. They have chased independence from Russian tyranny for centuries and will likely soon be brought back under the Russian yoke. This is not an advocation for any drop in Western support but rather an examination of the conflict. While the best interest of the world is a Ukrainian victory, it does not help to delude minds through unrealistic propaganda.